Meaning and understanding in large language models
This addresses a foundational philosophical and AI problem about machine understanding, with implications for evaluating LLM capabilities, but it is incremental in refining existing debates rather than introducing new empirical methods.
The paper tackles the problem of whether large language models (LLMs) can genuinely understand natural language, arguing against the view that their performance is merely shallow syntactic manipulation and instead positing that they can achieve semantic understanding and grounding.
Can a machine understand the meanings of natural language? Recent developments in the generative large language models (LLMs) of artificial intelligence have led to the belief that traditional philosophical assumptions about machine understanding of language need to be revised. This article critically evaluates the prevailing tendency to regard machine language performance as mere syntactic manipulation and the simulation of understanding, which is only partial and very shallow, without sufficient referential grounding in the world. The aim is to highlight the conditions crucial to attributing natural language understanding to state-of-the-art LLMs, where it can be legitimately argued that LLMs not only use syntax but also semantics, their understanding not being simulated but duplicated; and determine how they ground the meanings of linguistic expressions.