Erasing Self-Supervised Learning Backdoor by Cluster Activation Masking
This addresses a security vulnerability in SSL models for practitioners, offering a substantial improvement over existing defenses.
The paper tackles the problem of defending against backdoor attacks in self-supervised learning by proposing PoisonCAM, a method that detects and removes poisonous samples with 96% accuracy on ImageNet-100, significantly outperforming the state-of-the-art method at 3%.
Self-Supervised Learning (SSL) is an effective paradigm for learning representations from unlabeled data, such as text, images, and videos. However, researchers have recently found that SSL is vulnerable to backdoor attacks. The attacker can embed hidden SSL backdoors via a few poisoned examples in the training dataset and maliciously manipulate the behavior of downstream models. To defend against SSL backdoor attacks, a feasible route is to detect and remove the poisonous samples in the training set. However, the existing SSL backdoor defense method fails to detect the poisonous samples precisely. In this paper, we propose to erase the SSL backdoor by cluster activation masking and propose a novel PoisonCAM method. After obtaining the threat model trained on the poisoned dataset, our method can precisely detect poisonous samples based on the assumption that masking the backdoor trigger can effectively change the activation of a downstream clustering model. In experiments, our PoisonCAM achieves 96\% accuracy for backdoor trigger detection compared to 3\% of the state-of-the-art method on poisoned ImageNet-100. Moreover, our proposed PoisonCAM significantly improves the performance of the trained SSL model under backdoor attacks compared to the state-of-the-art method. Our code, data, and trained models will be open once this paper is accepted.