Physical Layer Location Privacy in SIMO Communication Using Fake Path Injection
For wireless communication users, this work provides a theoretical framework for location privacy against eavesdroppers using array-based localization.
The paper proposes fake path injection to obscure a transmitter's physical location in SIMO communications, defining a privacy metric based on eigenvalue ratios of Cramér-Rao bounds. It shows the privacy margin increases quadratically with inverse angular separation between true and fake paths.
Fake path injection is an emerging paradigm for inducing privacy over wireless networks. In this paper, fake paths are injected by the transmitters into a single-input multiple-output (SIMO) communication channel to obscure their physical location from an eavesdropper. The case where the receiver (Bob) and the eavesdropper (Eve) use a linear uniform array to locate the transmitter's (Alice) position is considered. A novel statistical privacy metric is defined as the ratio between the smallest (resp. largest) eigenvalues of Eve's (resp. Bob's) Cramér-Rao lower bound (CRB) on the SIMO channel parameters to assess the privacy enhancements. Leveraging the spectral properties of generalized Vandermonde matrices, bounds on the privacy margin of the proposed scheme are derived. Specifically, it is shown that the privacy margin increases quadratically in the inverse of the angular separation between the true and the fake paths under Eve's perspective. Numerical simulations validate the theoretical findings on CRBs and showcase the approach's benefit in terms of bit error rates achievable by Bob and Eve.