"Understanding AI": Semantic Grounding in Large Language Models
This addresses the philosophical and AI research problem of semantic grounding in LLMs, providing a nuanced framework for understanding their capabilities, though it is incremental in building on existing theories.
The paper tackles the problem of whether large language models (LLMs) possess semantic grounding, concluding that LLMs show basic evidence of understanding in functional, social, and causal dimensions, developing world models and thus understanding language in an elementary sense.
Do LLMs understand the meaning of the texts they generate? Do they possess a semantic grounding? And how could we understand whether and what they understand? I start the paper with the observation that we have recently witnessed a generative turn in AI, since generative models, including LLMs, are key for self-supervised learning. To assess the question of semantic grounding, I distinguish and discuss five methodological ways. The most promising way is to apply core assumptions of theories of meaning in philosophy of mind and language to LLMs. Grounding proves to be a gradual affair with a three-dimensional distinction between functional, social and causal grounding. LLMs show basic evidence in all three dimensions. A strong argument is that LLMs develop world models. Hence, LLMs are neither stochastic parrots nor semantic zombies, but already understand the language they generate, at least in an elementary sense.