Infrared Adversarial Car Stickers
This addresses security vulnerabilities in infrared AI systems used in critical applications such as autonomous driving, representing a novel extension from 2D to 3D attacks.
The paper tackled the problem of infrared physical adversarial attacks on AI systems like autonomous driving by designing infrared adversarial stickers to make cars invisible to detectors, achieving an attack success rate of 91.49% on real cars and demonstrating transferability across multiple detectors with rates between 73.35%-95.80%.
Infrared physical adversarial examples are of great significance for studying the security of infrared AI systems that are widely used in our lives such as autonomous driving. Previous infrared physical attacks mainly focused on 2D infrared pedestrian detection which may not fully manifest its destructiveness to AI systems. In this work, we propose a physical attack method against infrared detectors based on 3D modeling, which is applied to a real car. The goal is to design a set of infrared adversarial stickers to make cars invisible to infrared detectors at various viewing angles, distances, and scenes. We build a 3D infrared car model with real infrared characteristics and propose an infrared adversarial pattern generation method based on 3D mesh shadow. We propose a 3D control points-based mesh smoothing algorithm and use a set of smoothness loss functions to enhance the smoothness of adversarial meshes and facilitate the sticker implementation. Besides, We designed the aluminum stickers and conducted physical experiments on two real Mercedes-Benz A200L cars. Our adversarial stickers hid the cars from Faster RCNN, an object detector, at various viewing angles, distances, and scenes. The attack success rate (ASR) was 91.49% for real cars. In comparison, the ASRs of random stickers and no sticker were only 6.21% and 0.66%, respectively. In addition, the ASRs of the designed stickers against six unseen object detectors such as YOLOv3 and Deformable DETR were between 73.35%-95.80%, showing good transferability of the attack performance across detectors.