CRCLJul 4, 2024

Automated Progressive Red Teaming

arXiv:2407.03876v329 citationsh-index: 10Has Code
Originality Highly original
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This addresses the problem of scalable safety testing for LLMs, offering a novel framework that improves upon existing automated methods.

The paper tackles the challenge of identifying vulnerabilities in large language models (LLMs) by proposing Automated Progressive Red Teaming (APRT), a learnable framework that effectively elicits unsafe responses, achieving rates such as 54% from Llama-3-8B-Instruct and 50% from GPT-4o.

Ensuring the safety of large language models (LLMs) is paramount, yet identifying potential vulnerabilities is challenging. While manual red teaming is effective, it is time-consuming, costly and lacks scalability. Automated red teaming (ART) offers a more cost-effective alternative, automatically generating adversarial prompts to expose LLM vulnerabilities. However, in current ART efforts, a robust framework is absent, which explicitly frames red teaming as an effectively learnable task. To address this gap, we propose Automated Progressive Red Teaming (APRT) as an effectively learnable framework. APRT leverages three core modules: an Intention Expanding LLM that generates diverse initial attack samples, an Intention Hiding LLM that crafts deceptive prompts, and an Evil Maker to manage prompt diversity and filter ineffective samples. The three modules collectively and progressively explore and exploit LLM vulnerabilities through multi-round interactions. In addition to the framework, we further propose a novel indicator, Attack Effectiveness Rate (AER) to mitigate the limitations of existing evaluation metrics. By measuring the likelihood of eliciting unsafe but seemingly helpful responses, AER aligns closely with human evaluations. Extensive experiments with both automatic and human evaluations, demonstrate the effectiveness of ARPT across both open- and closed-source LLMs. Specifically, APRT effectively elicits 54% unsafe yet useful responses from Meta's Llama-3-8B-Instruct, 50% from GPT-4o (API access), and 39% from Claude-3.5 (API access), showcasing its robust attack capability and transferability across LLMs (especially from open-source LLMs to closed-source LLMs).

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