AoA-Based Physical Layer Authentication in Analog Arrays under Impersonation Attacks
This addresses security vulnerabilities in physical layer authentication for wireless communication systems, but it is incremental as it builds on existing AoA-based methods.
The paper tackled the problem of authenticating users in analog array MIMO systems using angle of arrival (AoA) under impersonation attacks, finding that some attack techniques with knowledge of the verifier's combiners can effectively falsify the AoA and compromise security.
We discuss the use of angle of arrival (AoA) as an authentication measure in analog array multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems. A base station equipped with an analog array authenticates users based on the AoA estimated from certified pilot transmissions, while active attackers manipulate their transmitted signals to mount impersonation attacks. We study several attacks of increasing intensity (captured through the availability of side information at the attackers) and assess the performance of AoA-based authentication using one-class classifiers. Our results show that some attack techniques with knowledge of the combiners at the verifier are effective in falsifying the AoA and compromising the security of the considered type of physical layer authentication.