Does Thought Require Sensory Grounding? From Pure Thinkers to Large Language Models
This addresses a foundational debate in philosophy and AI, but is incremental as it builds on existing discussions without introducing new empirical methods.
The paper tackles the philosophical problem of whether thinking requires sensory grounding, arguing that pure thinkers are possible in principle but with limitations, and uses large language models to rebut the sensory grounding argument against AI thought.
Does the capacity to think require the capacity to sense? A lively debate on this topic runs throughout the history of philosophy and now animates discussions of artificial intelligence. I argue that in principle, there can be pure thinkers: thinkers that lack the capacity to sense altogether. I also argue for significant limitations in just what sort of thought is possible in the absence of the capacity to sense. Regarding AI, I do not argue directly that large language models can think or understand, but I rebut one important argument (the argument from sensory grounding) that they cannot. I also use recent results regarding language models to address the question of whether or how sensory grounding enhances cognitive capacities.