A Case for AI Consciousness: Language Agents and Global Workspace Theory
This work addresses the problem of AI consciousness for researchers in AI and philosophy, but it is incremental as it builds on existing theories without new empirical results.
The paper challenges the assumption that AI systems are not conscious by arguing that if Global Workspace Theory (GWT) is correct, artificial language agents could be or become phenomenally conscious, and it develops a methodology for applying consciousness theories to AI.
It is generally assumed that existing artificial systems are not phenomenally conscious, and that the construction of phenomenally conscious artificial systems would require significant technological progress if it is possible at all. We challenge this assumption by arguing that if Global Workspace Theory (GWT) - a leading scientific theory of phenomenal consciousness - is correct, then instances of one widely implemented AI architecture, the artificial language agent, might easily be made phenomenally conscious if they are not already. Along the way, we articulate an explicit methodology for thinking about how to apply scientific theories of consciousness to artificial systems and employ this methodology to arrive at a set of necessary and sufficient conditions for phenomenal consciousness according to GWT.