Sequence-Level Leakage Risk of Training Data in Large Language Models
It addresses the problem of accurately assessing training data leakage risks for LLM developers and users, though it is incremental as it refines existing quantification methods.
This work quantifies the risk of training data leakage from large language models using sequence-level probabilities, revealing that the predominant metric underestimates the threat by up to 2.14X and that 30.4-41.5% of sequences are easier to extract with shorter prefixes or smaller models.
This work quantifies the risk of training data leakage from LLMs (Large Language Models) using sequence-level probabilities. Computing extraction probabilities for individual sequences provides finer-grained information than has been studied in prior benchmarking work. We re-analyze the effects of decoding schemes, model sizes, prefix lengths, partial sequence leakages, and token positions to uncover new insights that were not possible in previous works due to their choice of metrics. We perform this study on two pre-trained models, Llama and OPT, trained on the Common Crawl and The Pile respectively. We discover that 1) Extraction Rate, the predominant metric used in prior quantification work, underestimates the threat of leakage of training data in randomized LLMs by as much as 2.14X. 2) Although on average, larger models and longer prefixes can extract more data, this is not true for a substantial portion of individual sequences. 30.4-41.5% of our sequences are easier to extract with either shorter prefixes or smaller models. 3) Contrary to previous beliefs, partial leakage in commonly used decoding schemes like top-k and top-p is not easier than leaking verbatim training data. The aim of this work is to encourage the adoption of this metric for future work on quantification of training data extraction.