Online Housing Market
This addresses the challenge of dynamic agent participation in housing markets, which is incremental as it adapts existing mechanisms to a new scenario.
The paper tackles the problem of extending housing market mechanisms to an online setting where agents arrive and depart dynamically, aiming to retain properties like Pareto efficiency and strategy-proofness. It shows that achieving all desired properties simultaneously is impossible and presents variants that achieve different subsets.
This paper studies an online variant of the celebrated housing market problem, where each agent has a single house and seeks to exchange it for another based on her preferences. In this online setting, agents may arrive and depart at any time, meaning that not all agents are present on the housing market simultaneously. I extend the well known serial dictatorship and Gale s top trading cycle mechanisms to this online scenario, aiming to retain their desirable properties such as Pareto efficiency, individual rationality, and strategy proofness. These extensions also seek to prevent agents from strategically delaying their arrival or advancing their departure. I demonstrate that achieving all of these properties simultaneously is impossible in the online context, and I present several variants that achieve different subsets of these properties.