Elucidation of the Concept of Consciousness from the Theory of Non-Human Communication Agents
This work addresses the conceptual challenge of consciousness for researchers in philosophy and AI, but it is incremental as it builds on existing theories without presenting new empirical results.
The paper tackles the problem of defining consciousness by integrating theories from non-human communication agents, questioning associated concepts like autonomy and freedom, to contribute to ethical frameworks for designing and regulating these agents.
This article focuses on elucidating the concept of consciousness from a relational and post-phenomenological theory of non-human communication agents (ANHC). Specifically, we explore the contributions of Thomas Metzinger s Self Model Theory, Katherine Hayles conceptualizations of non-conscious cognitive processes centered on knowledge processing phenomena shared between biological and technical systems and Lenore and Manuel Blum s theoretical perspective on computation, which defines consciousness as an emergent phenomenon of complex computational systems, arising from the appropriate organization of their inorganic materiality. Building on interactions with non-human cognitive agents, among other factors, the explainability of sociotechnical systems challenges the humanistic common sense of modern philosophy and science. This critical integration of various approaches ultimately questions other concepts associated with consciousness, such as autonomy, freedom, and mutual responsibility. The aim is to contribute to a necessary discussion for designing new frameworks of understanding that pave the way toward an ethical and pragmatic approach to addressing contemporary challenges in the design, regulation, and interaction with ANHC. Such frameworks, in turn, enable a more inclusive and relational understanding of agency in an interconnected world.