Palatable Conceptions of Disembodied Being
This addresses philosophical challenges in AI and consciousness studies, but it is incremental as it builds on existing philosophical discourse without empirical results.
The paper tackles the problem of articulating a conception of consciousness compatible with disembodied AI systems, resulting in an analysis that yields emptiness in the Buddhist sense and undermines dualistic views of subjectivity and selfhood.
Is it possible to articulate a conception of consciousness that is compatible with the exotic characteristics of contemporary, disembodied AI systems, and that can stand up to philosophical scrutiny? How would subjective time and selfhood show up for an entity that conformed to such a conception? Trying to answer these questions, even metaphorically, stretches the language of consciousness to breaking point. Ultimately, the attempt yields something like emptiness, in the Buddhist sense, and helps to undermine our dualistic inclinations towards subjectivity and selfhood.