Programs as Singularities
This work provides a foundational insight into the meaning of simplicity in inductive inference, with implications for machine learning theory.
The paper establishes a correspondence between Turing machine structures and singularities of real analytic functions, linking algorithmic implementations to Bayesian inference and showing that the Bayesian posterior can differentiate between distinct algorithms even when they produce the same predictions.
We develop a correspondence between the structure of Turing machines and the structure of singularities of real analytic functions, based on connecting the Ehrhard-Regnier derivative from linear logic with the role of geometry in Watanabe's singular learning theory. The correspondence works by embedding ordinary (discrete) Turing machine codes into a family of noisy codes which form a smooth parameter space. On this parameter space we consider a potential function which has Turing machines as critical points. By relating the Taylor series expansion of this potential at such a critical point to combinatorics of error syndromes, we relate the local geometry to internal structure of the Turing machine. The potential in question is the negative log-likelihood for a statistical model, so that the structure of the Turing machine and its associated singularity is further related to Bayesian inference. Two algorithms that produce the same predictive function can nonetheless correspond to singularities with different geometries, which implies that the Bayesian posterior can discriminate between distinct algorithmic implementations, contrary to a purely functional view of inference. In the context of singular learning theory our results point to a more nuanced understanding of Occam's razor and the meaning of simplicity in inductive inference.