The end of radical concept nativism
This addresses a foundational debate in cognitive science and philosophy of mind about human learning capabilities, but it is incremental as it builds on prior arguments and formalizations.
The paper tackles the problem of radical concept nativism, which argues that humans cannot learn fundamentally new concepts, by identifying three critical points where this theory diverges from actual human cognition and using computer science and information theory to formalize the ideas, concluding that people do learn new concepts.
Though humans seem to be remarkable learners, arguments in cognitive science and philosophy of mind have long maintained that learning something fundamentally new is impossible. Specifically, Jerry Fodor's arguments for radical concept nativism hold that most, if not all, concepts are innate and that what many call concept learning never actually leads to the acquisition of new concepts. These arguments have deeply affected cognitive science, and many believe that the counterarguments to radical concept nativism have been either unsuccessful or only apply to a narrow class of concepts. This paper first reviews the features and limitations of prior arguments. We then identify three critical points - related to issues of expressive power, conceptual structure, and concept possession - at which the arguments in favor of radical concept nativism diverge from describing actual human cognition. We use ideas from computer science and information theory to formalize the relevant ideas in ways that are arguably more scientifically productive. We conclude that, as a result, there is an important sense in which people do indeed learn new concepts.