Phantom Subgroup Poisoning: Stealth Attacks on Federated Recommender Systems
This addresses a security vulnerability in privacy-preserving recommender systems, enabling stealthy attacks on specific user groups, which is an incremental but practical advancement over existing broad attacks.
The paper tackles the problem of targeted poisoning attacks on federated recommender systems, introducing Spattack to manipulate recommendations for specific user subgroups with minimal impact on others, achieving strong manipulation even with only 0.1% malicious users.
Federated recommender systems (FedRec) have emerged as a promising solution for delivering personalized recommendations while safeguarding user privacy. However, recent studies have demonstrated their vulnerability to poisoning attacks. Existing attacks typically target the entire user group, which compromises stealth and increases the risk of detection. In contrast, real-world adversaries may prefer to prompt target items to specific user subgroups, such as recommending health supplements to elderly users. Motivated by this gap, we introduce Spattack, the first targeted poisoning attack designed to manipulate recommendations for specific user subgroups in the federated setting. Specifically, Spattack adopts a two-stage approximation-and-promotion strategy, which first simulates user embeddings of target/non-target subgroups and then prompts target items to the target subgroups. To enhance the approximation stage, we push the inter-group embeddings away based on contrastive learning and augment the target group's relevant item set based on clustering. To enhance the promotion stage, we further propose to adaptively tune the optimization weights between target and non-target subgroups. Besides, an embedding alignment strategy is proposed to align the embeddings between the target items and the relevant items. We conduct comprehensive experiments on three real-world datasets, comparing Spattack against seven state-of-the-art poisoning attacks and seven representative defense mechanisms. Experimental results demonstrate that Spattack consistently achieves strong manipulation performance on the specific user subgroup, while incurring minimal impact on non-target users, even when only 0.1\% of users are malicious. Moreover, Spattack maintains competitive overall recommendation performance and exhibits strong resilience against existing mainstream defenses.