VTarbel: Targeted Label Attack with Minimal Knowledge on Detector-enhanced Vertical Federated Learning
This addresses security threats in VFL deployments for practitioners, though it is incremental as it builds on existing attack methods while considering detectors.
The paper tackles targeted label attacks in vertical federated learning (VFL) by introducing VTarbel, a two-stage attack framework that evades anomaly detectors with minimal knowledge. The results show VTarbel outperforms four baselines across seven datasets and four model architectures while evading detection and remaining effective against three privacy-preserving defenses.
Vertical federated learning (VFL) enables multiple parties with disjoint features to collaboratively train models without sharing raw data. While privacy vulnerabilities of VFL are extensively-studied, its security threats-particularly targeted label attacks-remain underexplored. In such attacks, a passive party perturbs inputs at inference to force misclassification into adversary-chosen labels. Existing methods rely on unrealistic assumptions (e.g., accessing VFL-model's outputs) and ignore anomaly detectors deployed in real-world systems. To bridge this gap, we introduce VTarbel, a two-stage, minimal-knowledge attack framework explicitly designed to evade detector-enhanced VFL inference. During the preparation stage, the attacker selects a minimal set of high-expressiveness samples (via maximum mean discrepancy), submits them through VFL protocol to collect predicted labels, and uses these pseudo-labels to train estimated detector and surrogate model on local features. In attack stage, these models guide gradient-based perturbations of remaining samples, crafting adversarial instances that induce targeted misclassifications and evade detection. We implement VTarbel and evaluate it against four model architectures, seven multimodal datasets, and two anomaly detectors. Across all settings, VTarbel outperforms four state-of-the-art baselines, evades detection, and retains effective against three representative privacy-preserving defenses. These results reveal critical security blind spots in current VFL deployments and underscore urgent need for robust, attack-aware defenses.