PromptFlare: Prompt-Generalized Defense via Cross-Attention Decoy in Diffusion-Based Inpainting
This addresses security concerns for image owners against unauthorized AI-driven manipulations, representing an incremental improvement over prior adversarial defense methods.
The paper tackles the problem of protecting images from malicious modifications by diffusion-based inpainting models, proposing PromptFlare which achieves state-of-the-art performance on the EditBench dataset while reducing computational overhead and GPU memory usage.
The success of diffusion models has enabled effortless, high-quality image modifications that precisely align with users' intentions, thereby raising concerns about their potential misuse by malicious actors. Previous studies have attempted to mitigate such misuse through adversarial attacks. However, these approaches heavily rely on image-level inconsistencies, which pose fundamental limitations in addressing the influence of textual prompts. In this paper, we propose PromptFlare, a novel adversarial protection method designed to protect images from malicious modifications facilitated by diffusion-based inpainting models. Our approach leverages the cross-attention mechanism to exploit the intrinsic properties of prompt embeddings. Specifically, we identify and target shared token of prompts that is invariant and semantically uninformative, injecting adversarial noise to suppress the sampling process. The injected noise acts as a cross-attention decoy, diverting the model's focus away from meaningful prompt-image alignments and thereby neutralizing the effect of prompt. Extensive experiments on the EditBench dataset demonstrate that our method achieves state-of-the-art performance across various metrics while significantly reducing computational overhead and GPU memory usage. These findings highlight PromptFlare as a robust and efficient protection against unauthorized image manipulations. The code is available at https://github.com/NAHOHYUN-SKKU/PromptFlare.