Entry Barriers in Content Markets
This provides a theoretical foundation for designing mechanisms to promote higher-quality content and healthier online ecosystems, addressing a domain-specific issue for platform designers and users.
The paper tackles the problem of low-quality content on online platforms by investigating how entry barriers and reward mechanisms can enhance content quality, showing that both structural and strategic barriers can improve overall content quality in game-theoretic models.
The prevalence of low-quality content on online platforms is often attributed to the absence of meaningful entry requirements. This motivates us to investigate whether implicit or explicit entry barriers, alongside appropriate reward mechanisms, can enhance content quality. We present the first game-theoretic analysis of two distinct types of entry barriers in online content platforms. The first, a structural barrier, emerges from the collective behaviour of incumbent content providers which disadvantages new entrants. We show that both rank-order and proportional-share reward mechanisms induce such a structural barrier at Nash equilibrium. The second, a strategic barrier, involves the platform proactively imposing entry fees to discourage participation from low-quality contributors. We consider a scheme in which the platform redirects some or all of the entry fees into the reward pool. We formally demonstrate that this approach can improve overall content quality. Our findings establish a theoretical foundation for designing reward mechanisms coupled with entry fees to promote higher-quality content and support healthier online ecosystems.