Approximating Electoral Control Problems
For researchers in computational social choice, this fills a gap by providing approximability results for electoral control, complementing existing complexity results.
This paper determines the approximability of standard electoral control problems under plurality, approval, and Condorcet voting rules, in both weighted and unweighted voter settings, providing a complete classification.
Much research in electoral control -- one of the most studied form of electoral attacks, in which an entity running an election alters the structure of that election to yield a preferred outcome -- has focused on giving decision complexity results, e.g., membership in P, NP-completeness, or fixed-parameter tractability. Approximability on the other hand has received little attention in electoral control, despite its prevalence in the study of other forms of electoral attacks, such as manipulation and bribery. Early work established preliminary results about popular voting rules such as plurality, approval, and Condorcet. In this paper, we completely determine for each of the "standard" control problems under plurality, approval, and Condorcet, whether they are approximable, and we prove our results in both the weighted and unweighted voter settings.