Grouped Satisficing Paths in Pure Strategy Games: a Topological Perspective
This provides a stronger theoretical foundation for designing multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms, addressing a fundamental question in game theory.
The paper tackles the problem of ensuring finite-length satisficing paths to equilibria in multi-agent games, establishing a sufficient condition and proving that any finite-state Markov game or N-player game guarantees such paths from any initial strategy.
In game theory and multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), each agent selects a strategy, interacts with the environment and other agents, and subsequently updates its strategy based on the received payoff. This process generates a sequence of joint strategies $(s^t)_{t \geq 0}$, where $s^t$ represents the strategy profile of all agents at time step $t$. A widely adopted principle in MARL algorithms is "win-stay, lose-shift", which dictates that an agent retains its current strategy if it achieves the best response. This principle exhibits a fixed-point property when the joint strategy has become an equilibrium. The sequence of joint strategies under this principle is referred to as a satisficing path, a concept first introduced in [40] and explored in the context of $N$-player games in [39]. A fundamental question arises regarding this principle: Under what conditions does every initial joint strategy $s$ admit a finite-length satisficing path $(s^t)_{0 \leq t \leq T}$ where $s^0=s$ and $s^T$ is an equilibrium? This paper establishes a sufficient condition for such a property, and demonstrates that any finite-state Markov game, as well as any $N$-player game, guarantees the existence of a finite-length satisficing path from an arbitrary initial strategy to some equilibrium. These results provide a stronger theoretical foundation for the design of MARL algorithms.