LMM-Incentive: Large Multimodal Model-based Incentive Design for User-Generated Content in Web 3.0
This addresses content quality issues for decentralized Web 3.0 platforms, representing an incremental improvement combining existing techniques in a novel application.
The paper tackles the problem of low-quality user-generated content in Web 3.0 by proposing LMM-Incentive, a Large Multimodal Model-based incentive mechanism that uses contract theory and an improved Mixture of Experts PPO algorithm to motivate high-quality content, with simulation results showing superiority over benchmarks.
Web 3.0 represents the next generation of the Internet, which is widely recognized as a decentralized ecosystem that focuses on value expression and data ownership. By leveraging blockchain and artificial intelligence technologies, Web 3.0 offers unprecedented opportunities for users to create, own, and monetize their content, thereby enabling User-Generated Content (UGC) to an entirely new level. However, some self-interested users may exploit the limitations of content curation mechanisms and generate low-quality content with less effort, obtaining platform rewards under information asymmetry. Such behavior can undermine Web 3.0 performance. To this end, we propose \textit{LMM-Incentive}, a novel Large Multimodal Model (LMM)-based incentive mechanism for UGC in Web 3.0. Specifically, we propose an LMM-based contract-theoretic model to motivate users to generate high-quality UGC, thereby mitigating the adverse selection problem from information asymmetry. To alleviate potential moral hazards after contract selection, we leverage LMM agents to evaluate UGC quality, which is the primary component of the contract, utilizing prompt engineering techniques to improve the evaluation performance of LMM agents. Recognizing that traditional contract design methods cannot effectively adapt to the dynamic environment of Web 3.0, we develop an improved Mixture of Experts (MoE)-based Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) algorithm for optimal contract design. Simulation results demonstrate the superiority of the proposed MoE-based PPO algorithm over representative benchmarks in the context of contract design. Finally, we deploy the designed contract within an Ethereum smart contract framework, further validating the effectiveness of the proposed scheme.