The Algebra of Meaning: Why Machines Need Montague More Than Moore's Law
This addresses the problem of unreliable AI in business and legal contexts by offering a novel approach to meaning representation, though it is incremental in combining existing ideas.
The paper tackles the problem of language models mishandling meaning types, leading to issues like hallucination and compliance failures, by proposing Savassan, a neuro-symbolic architecture that compiles utterances into typed logical forms for cross-jurisdictional reasoning, with plans for evaluation on legal benchmarks.
Contemporary language models are fluent yet routinely mis-handle the types of meaning their outputs entail. We argue that hallucination, brittle moderation, and opaque compliance outcomes are symptoms of missing type-theoretic semantics rather than data or scale limitations. Building on Montague's view of language as typed, compositional algebra, we recast alignment as a parsing problem: natural-language inputs must be compiled into structures that make explicit their descriptive, normative, and legal dimensions under context. We present Savassan, a neuro-symbolic architecture that compiles utterances into Montague-style logical forms and maps them to typed ontologies extended with deontic operators and jurisdictional contexts. Neural components extract candidate structures from unstructured inputs; symbolic components perform type checking, constraint reasoning, and cross-jurisdiction mapping to produce compliance-aware guidance rather than binary censorship. In cross-border scenarios, the system "parses once" (e.g., defect claim(product x, company y)) and projects the result into multiple legal ontologies (e.g., defamation risk in KR/JP, protected opinion in US, GDPR checks in EU), composing outcomes into a single, explainable decision. This paper contributes: (i) a diagnosis of hallucination as a type error; (ii) a formal Montague-ontology bridge for business/legal reasoning; and (iii) a production-oriented design that embeds typed interfaces across the pipeline. We outline an evaluation plan using legal reasoning benchmarks and synthetic multi-jurisdiction suites. Our position is that trustworthy autonomy requires compositional typing of meaning, enabling systems to reason about what is described, what is prescribed, and what incurs liability within a unified algebra of meaning.