Physical Layer Deception as a Stackelberg Game: Strategy Regimes, Equilibrium, and Robust Design
For wireless security researchers, this provides a game-theoretic framework for deception-based PLS with quantified performance gains over existing methods.
This paper models physical layer deception as a Stackelberg game, deriving closed-form switching surfaces for strategy regimes and showing the robust operating point is a Stackelberg equilibrium. Numerical results demonstrate 12-55% higher eavesdropper distortion compared to a classical PLS baseline under Nakagami-m fading.
Physical layer deception (PLD) combines physical layer security (PLS) with deception: the transmitter actively misleads the eavesdropper with falsified information. We model the transmitter-eavesdropper interaction as a Stackelberg game in which the transmitter commits to a resource allocation and encryption strategy, and each receiver best-responds by selecting among three decryption modes: Perception, Dropping, and Exclusion. Using semantic distortion as the metric, we derive closed-form switching surfaces that partition the parameter space into strategy regimes and identify conditions under which each regime dominates. The robust operating point, at the peak of the worst-case distortion envelope, is shown to be a Stackelberg equilibrium; iterative best-response dynamics oscillate around it with strictly lower time-averaged security. We evaluate the design under Nakagami-m fading with static and adaptive transmitter strategies, benchmarked against a classical PLS baseline. Numerical results validate the regime characterization and show 12-55% higher eavesdropper distortion than the erasure-only baseline across all fading conditions.