Knowledge and Common Knowledge of Strategies
This work addresses the need for more precise strategic reasoning models in game theory and distributed systems, though it appears incremental by refining existing semantics rather than introducing a new paradigm.
The authors tackled the problem of modeling strategic reasoning by introducing a fine-grained model that distinguishes first-order, higher-order, and common knowledge of strategies, demonstrating its application in the game Hanabi and showing that common knowledge is necessary for solving the consensus problem.
Most existing work on strategic reasoning simply adopts either an informed or an uninformed semantics. We propose a model where knowledge of strategies can be specified on a fine-grained level. In particular, it is possible to distinguish first-order, higher-order, and common knowledge of strategies. We illustrate the effect of higher-order knowledge of strategies by studying the game Hanabi. Further, we show that common knowledge of strategies is necessary to solve the consensus problem. Finally, we study the decidability of the model checking problem.