Rational Adversaries and the Maintenance of Fragility: A Game-Theoretic Theory of Rational Stagnation
This provides a theoretical explanation for persistent inefficiencies in systems like social media or politics, but it is incremental as it builds on existing game theory concepts.
The paper tackles the problem of cooperative systems remaining in suboptimal stable states by introducing a game-theoretic model with a rational adversary, showing that a fragile cooperation band exists where both cooperation and defection are equilibria, and identifying three strategic regimes including rational stagnation.
Cooperative systems often remain in persistently suboptimal yet stable states. This paper explains such "rational stagnation" as an equilibrium sustained by a rational adversary whose utility follows the principle of potential loss, $u_{D} = U_{ideal} - U_{actual}$. Starting from the Prisoner's Dilemma, we show that the transformation $u_{i}' = a\,u_{i} + b\,u_{j}$ and the ratio of mutual recognition $w = b/a$ generate a fragile cooperation band $[w_{\min},\,w_{\max}]$ where both (C,C) and (D,D) are equilibria. Extending to a dynamic model with stochastic cooperative payoffs $R_{t}$ and intervention costs $(C_{c},\,C_{m})$, a Bellman-style analysis yields three strategic regimes: immediate destruction, rational stagnation, and intervention abandonment. The appendix further generalizes the utility to a reference-dependent nonlinear form and proves its stability under reference shifts, ensuring robustness of the framework. Applications to social-media algorithms and political trust illustrate how adversarial rationality can deliberately preserve fragility.