SecDiff: Diffusion-Aided Secure Deep Joint Source-Channel Coding Against Adversarial Attacks
This work addresses security issues in semantic communications for wireless environments, offering an incremental improvement over prior methods by reducing inference latency and enhancing attack resilience.
The paper tackles the vulnerability of deep joint source-channel coding (JSCC) to adversarial attacks like pilot spoofing and jamming, proposing SecDiff, a diffusion-aided decoding framework that enhances security and robustness while balancing reconstruction quality and computational cost, outperforming existing baselines in experiments.
Deep joint source-channel coding (JSCC) has emerged as a promising paradigm for semantic communication, delivering significant performance gains over conventional separate coding schemes. However, existing JSCC frameworks remain vulnerable to physical-layer adversarial threats, such as pilot spoofing and subcarrier jamming, compromising semantic fidelity. In this paper, we propose SecDiff, a plug-and-play, diffusion-aided decoding framework that significantly enhances the security and robustness of deep JSCC under adversarial wireless environments. Different from prior diffusion-guided JSCC methods that suffer from high inference latency, SecDiff employs pseudoinverse-guided sampling and adaptive guidance weighting, enabling flexible step-size control and efficient semantic reconstruction. To counter jamming attacks, we introduce a power-based subcarrier masking strategy and recast recovery as a masked inpainting problem, solved via diffusion guidance. For pilot spoofing, we formulate channel estimation as a blind inverse problem and develop an expectation-minimization (EM)-driven reconstruction algorithm, guided jointly by reconstruction loss and a channel operator. Notably, our method alternates between pilot recovery and channel estimation, enabling joint refinement of both variables throughout the diffusion process. Extensive experiments over orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) channels under adversarial conditions show that SecDiff outperforms existing secure and generative JSCC baselines by achieving a favorable trade-off between reconstruction quality and computational cost. This balance makes SecDiff a promising step toward practical, low-latency, and attack-resilient semantic communications.