Sensor Attack Detection Method for Encrypted State Observers
For control systems security, this work extends attack detection to encrypted multi-input multi-output systems, addressing a limitation of prior single-input single-output approaches.
This paper proposes an encrypted state observer for multi-input multi-output systems that detects sensor attacks without decryption, using a residue signal generated from modular arithmetic over a finite field. The method ensures state recovery as an encrypted message when the residue is below a threshold.
This paper proposes an encrypted state observer that is capable of detecting sensor attacks without decryption. We first design a state observer that operates over a finite field of integers with the modular arithmetic. The observer generates a residue signal that indicates the presence of attacks under sparse attack and sensing redundancy conditions. Then, we develop a homomorphic encryption scheme that enables the observer to operate over encrypted data while automatically disclosing the residue signal. Unlike our previous work restricted to single-input single-output systems, the proposed scheme is applicable to general multi-input multi-output systems. Given that the disclosed residue signal remains below a prescribed threshold, the full state can be recovered as an encrypted message.