The algorithmic muse and the public domain: Why copyrights legal philosophy precludes protection for generative AI outputs
This addresses the legal and philosophical problem of copyright for AI-generated content, which is incremental in re-evaluating foundational theories.
The paper argues that generative AI outputs should not be copyrightable because they lack a direct human creative link, and granting copyright would harm the public domain and innovation.
Generative AI (GenAI) outputs are not copyrightable. This article argues why. We bypass conventional doctrinal analysis that focuses on black letter law notions of originality and authorship to re-evaluate copyright's foundational philosophy. GenAI fundamentally severs the direct human creative link to expressive form. Traditional theories utilitarian incentive, labor desert and personality fail to provide coherent justification for protection. The public domain constitutes the default baseline for intellectual creations. Those seeking copyright coverage for GenAI outputs bear the burden of proof. Granting copyright to raw GenAI outputs would not only be philosophically unsound but would also trigger an unprecedented enclosure of the digital commons, creating a legal quagmire and stifling future innovation. The paper advocates for a clear distinction: human creative contributions to AI-generated works may warrant protection, but the raw algorithmic output should remain in the public domain.