A Post-Quantum Secure End-to-End Verifiable E-Voting Protocol Based on Multivariate Polynomials
For e-voting system designers, this work provides a quantum-resistant alternative to number-theoretic protocols, though it is an initial design without concrete performance numbers.
The paper presents the first post-quantum secure end-to-end verifiable e-voting protocol based on multivariate polynomials, addressing the vulnerability of existing designs to quantum attacks. The protocol's security relies on the NP-hard MQ problem, and it uses only standard cryptographic primitives.
Voting is a primary democratic activity through which voters select representatives or approve policies. Conventional paper ballot elections have several drawbacks that might compromise the fairness, effectiveness, and accessibility of the voting process. Therefore, there is an increasing need to design safer, effective, and easily accessible alternatives. E-Voting is one such solution that uses digital tools to simplify voting. Existing state-of-the-art designs for secure E-Voting are based on number-theoretic hardness assumptions. These designs are no longer secure due to quantum algorithms such as Shor's algorithm. We present the design and analysis of \textit{first} post-quantum secure end-to-end verifiable E-Voting protocol based on multivariate polynomials to address this issue. The security of our proposed design depends on the hardness of the MQ problem, which is an NP-hard problem. We present a simple yet efficient design involving only standard cryptographic primitives as building blocks.