Storage-Rate Trade-off in A-XPIR
This work advances the theoretical understanding of secure PIR under asymmetric security and collusion constraints, but the results are limited to specific small-scale cases and are incremental relative to existing PIR trade-off studies.
The paper characterizes the trade-off between storage and download cost in asymmetric X-secure private information retrieval (A-XPIR), deriving achievable regions and exact capacity for specific server configurations (e.g., N=4, K=2). It shows that security constraints reduce the number of inequalities compared to the no-security case and provides a scheme achieving optimal rate without replication.
We consider the storage problem in an asymmetric $X$-secure private information retrieval (A-XPIR) setting. The A-XPIR setting considers the $X$-secure PIR problem (XPIR) when a given arbitrary set of servers is communicating. We focus on the trade-off region between the average storage at the servers and the average download cost. In the case of $N=4$ servers and two non-overlapping sets of communicating servers with $K=2$ messages, we characterize the achievable region and show that the three main inequalities compared to the no-security case collapse to two inequalities in the asymmetric security case. In the general case, we derive bounds that need to be satisfied for the general achievable region for an arbitrary number of servers and messages. In addition, we provide the storage and retrieval scheme for the case of $N=4$ servers with $K=2$ messages and two non-overlapping sets of communicating servers, such that the messages are not replicated (in the sense of a coded version of each symbol) and at the same time achieve the optimal achievable rate for the case of replication. Finally, we derive the exact capacity for the case of asymmetric security and asymmetric collusion for $N=4$ servers, with the communication links $\{1,2\}$ and $\{3,4\}$, which splits the servers into two groups, i.e., $g=2$, and with the collusion links $\{1,3\}$, $\{2,4\}$, as $C=\frac{1}{3}$. More generally, we derive a capacity result for a certain family of asymmetric collusion and asymmetric security cases.