Can Adversarial Code Comments Fool AI Security Reviewers -- Large-Scale Empirical Study of Comment-Based Attacks and Defenses Against LLM Code Analysis
This addresses the security of AI-assisted code review systems for developers and organizations, showing that comment-based attacks are ineffective, which is an incremental finding as it contrasts with prior work on code generation.
The study investigated whether adversarial code comments could fool AI security reviewers during vulnerability detection, finding that such comments produced small, statistically non-significant effects on detection accuracy across eight frontier models in 9,366 trials, with no meaningful degradation compared to baseline performance.
AI-assisted code review is widely used to detect vulnerabilities before production release. Prior work shows that adversarial prompt manipulation can degrade large language model (LLM) performance in code generation. We test whether similar comment-based manipulation misleads LLMs during vulnerability detection. We build a 100-sample benchmark across Python, JavaScript, and Java, each paired with eight comment variants ranging from no comments to adversarial strategies such as authority spoofing and technical deception. Eight frontier models, five commercial and three open-source, are evaluated in 9,366 trials. Adversarial comments produce small, statistically non-significant effects on detection accuracy (McNemar exact p > 0.21; all 95 percent confidence intervals include zero). This holds for commercial models with 89 to 96 percent baseline detection and open-source models with 53 to 72 percent, despite large absolute performance gaps. Unlike generation settings where comment manipulation achieves high attack success, detection performance does not meaningfully degrade. More complex adversarial strategies offer no advantage over simple manipulative comments. We test four automated defenses across 4,646 additional trials (14,012 total). Static analysis cross-referencing performs best at 96.9 percent detection and recovers 47 percent of baseline misses. Comment stripping reduces detection for weaker models by removing helpful context. Failures concentrate on inherently difficult vulnerability classes, including race conditions, timing side channels, and complex authorization logic, rather than on adversarial comments.