Matching with Committee Preferences
For school choice and similar matching markets with committee-based evaluation, this provides a new equilibrium framework to handle multiple rankings.
This paper addresses many-to-one matching with committee preferences, where schools use multiple rankings. It defines stability via acceptability and constructs approximately stable outcomes using a Lindahl equilibrium over ordinal preferences.
We study a many-to-one matching model inspired by school choice, where schools evaluate applicants using multiple rankings rather than a single priority order. We model each school's evaluation with social choice criteria to reflect the school's internal ranking process. In particular, we define acceptable choices as candidates ranked above a top percentile of the accepted cohort by a sufficient number of evaluators. Stability is then defined in terms of acceptability: accepted candidates must receive strong support, while rejected candidates receive at most weak support. Since exact acceptability and stability may not exist, we construct approximately stable outcomes using a new equilibrium concept that combines matching with a Lindahl equilibrium over ordinal preferences, providing a flexible, equilibrium-based framework for committee-based matching markets.