Radio-Frequency Side-Channel Analysis of a Trapped-Ion Quantum Computer
This reveals a novel security vulnerability in quantum processors that could allow attackers to steal proprietary quantum algorithms.
The researchers identified and exploited a previously unexplored radio-frequency side channel in trapped-ion quantum computers that leaks information about quantum gate operations, demonstrating they could extract pulse characteristics of single-ion and entangling gates using off-the-shelf components.
Analogously to classical computers, quantum processors exhibit side channels that may give attackers access to potentially proprietary algorithms. We identify and exploit a previously unexplored side channel in trapped-ion quantum processors that arises from the radio-frequency (RF) signals used to modulate lasers for ion cooling, gate execution, and readout. In these quantum processors, acousto-optical modulators (AOMs) imprint phase and frequency modulations onto laser fields interacting with the ions to implement individual and collective unitaries. The AOMs are driven by strong RF signals, a fraction of which leaks out of the device. We discuss general strategies to exploit this side channel and demonstrate how to detect RF leakage from a state-of-the-art qudit-based quantum processor using off-the-shelf components. From this data, we extract pulse characteristics of single-ion and entangling gates, thereby implementing a proof-of-principle exploitation of the novel attack vector. Finally, we outline ways to mitigate the information leakage through the presented side channel.