CRMar 10

Reasoning-Oriented Programming: Chaining Semantic Gadgets to Jailbreak Large Vision Language Models

arXiv:2603.09246v142.9h-index: 7Has Code
Predicted impact top 2% in CR · last 90 daysOriginality Highly original
AI Analysis

This work addresses a systemic flaw in LVLM safety for users relying on secure AI systems, representing a novel attack paradigm rather than an incremental improvement.

The paper tackles the problem of safety alignment in Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) being vulnerable to attacks that exploit compositional reasoning, and it introduces Reasoning-Oriented Programming to bypass these defenses, achieving an average improvement of 4.67% on open-source models and 9.50% on commercial models over existing baselines.

Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) undergo safety alignment to suppress harmful content. However, current defenses predominantly target explicit malicious patterns in the input representation, often overlooking the vulnerabilities inherent in compositional reasoning. In this paper, we identify a systemic flaw where LVLMs can be induced to synthesize harmful logic from benign premises. We formalize this attack paradigm as \textit{Reasoning-Oriented Programming}, drawing a structural analogy to Return-Oriented Programming in systems security. Just as ROP circumvents memory protections by chaining benign instruction sequences, our approach exploits the model's instruction-following capability to orchestrate a semantic collision of orthogonal benign inputs. We instantiate this paradigm via \tool{}, an automated framework that optimizes for \textit{semantic orthogonality} and \textit{spatial isolation}. By generating visual gadgets that are semantically decoupled from the harmful intent and arranging them to prevent premature feature fusion, \tool{} forces the malicious logic to emerge only during the late-stage reasoning process. This effectively bypasses perception-level alignment. We evaluate \tool{} on SafeBench and MM-SafetyBench across 7 state-of-the-art 0.LVLMs, including GPT-4o and Claude 3.7 Sonnet. Our results demonstrate that \tool{} consistently circumvents safety alignment, outperforming the strongest existing baseline by an average of 4.67\% on open-source models and 9.50\% on commercial models.

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