Bridging the Gap Between Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates: A Parametrized Algorithm for Optimal Stable Matchings
This work provides a theoretical framework for efficiently solving a previously intractable problem in matching theory, benefiting researchers in algorithmic game theory and combinatorial optimization.
The paper introduces a parametrized algorithm for finding optimal stable matchings in the Stable Roommates Problem, which is NP-hard in general. By defining a structural distance to the Stable Marriage Problem, they show that optimal stable matchings can be computed in time 2^{O(k)} n^{O(1)} for instances with minimum crossing distance k, making the problem fixed-parameter tractable.
In the Stable Roommates Problem (SR), a set of $2n$ agents rank one another in a linear order. The goal is to find a matching that is stable, one that has no pair of agents who mutually prefer each other over their assigned partners. We consider the problem of finding an {\it optimal} stable matching. Agents associate weights with each of their potential partners, and the goal is to find a stable matching that minimizes the sum of the associated weights. Efficient algorithms exist for finding optimal stable marriages in the Stable Marriage Problem (SM), but the problem is NP-hard for general SR instances. In this paper, we define a notion of structural distance between SR instances and SM instances, which we call the \emph{minimum crossing distance}. When an SR instance has minimum crossing distance $0$, the instance is structurally equivalent to an SM instance, and this structure can be exploited to find optimal stable matchings efficiently. More generally, we show that for an SR instance with minimum crossing distance $k$, optimal stable matchings can be computed in time $2^{O(k)} n^{O(1)}$. Thus, the optimal stable matching problem is fixed parameter tractable (FPT) with respect to minimum crossing distance.