Iran's January 2026 Internet Shutdown: Public Data, Censorship Methods, and Circumvention Techniques
It addresses the problem of understanding large-scale, state-imposed Internet disruptions for researchers and policymakers, though it is incremental in applying existing methods to a new event.
This paper analyzes the January 2026 Internet shutdown in Iran during protests, characterizing its timeline, detectability, and the interplay between censorship and circumvention techniques to provide a unified understanding of the event.
This paper analyzes the Internet shutdown that occurred in Iran in January 2026 in the context of protests, focusing on its impact on the country's digital communication infrastructure and on information access and control dynamics. The scale, complexity, and nation-state nature of the event motivate a comprehensive investigation that goes beyond isolated reports, aiming to provide a unified and systematic understanding of what happened and how it was observed. The study is guided by a set of research questions addressing: the characterization of the shutdown via the timeline of the disruption events and post-event "new normal"; the detectability of the event, encompassing monitoring initiatives, measurement techniques, and precursory signals; and the interplay between censorship and circumvention, assessing both the imposed restrictions and the effectiveness of tools designed to bypass them. To answer these questions, we adopt a multi-source, multi-perspective methodology that integrates heterogeneous public data, primarily from grey literature produced by network measurement and monitoring initiatives, complemented by additional private measurements. This approach enables a holistic view of the event and allows us to reconcile and compare partial observations from different sources.