H Infinity Minimal Destabilizing Feedback for Vulnerability Analysis and Attack Design of Nonlinear Systems
It provides a theoretical foundation for vulnerability analysis and attack design in critical infrastructure control systems.
This paper uses robust control theory to design minimal destabilizing feedback attacks for nonlinear systems, proving that slightly increasing the attack gain beyond the stability boundary guarantees destabilization for a broad class of systems.
The robust stability problem involves designing a controlled system which remains stable in the presence of modeling uncertainty. In this context, results known as small gain theorems are used to quantify the maximum amount of uncertainty for which stability is guaranteed. These notions inform the design of numerous control systems, including critical infrastructure components such as power grids, gas pipelines, and water systems. However, these same concepts can be used by an adversary to design a malicious feedback attack, of minimal size, to drive the closed-loop system to instability. In this paper, we first present a detailed review of the results in robust control which allow for the construction of minimal destabilizers. These minimally sized attacks merely push the system to the stability boundary, which we demonstrate do not necessarily destabilize nonlinear systems even when the linearization is destabilized. Our main result leverages linear perturbation theory to explicitly prove, in the state space context, that internal destabilization is guaranteed for a broad class of nonlinear systems when the gain of these attacks is slightly increased.