Adversarial Attenuation Patch Attack for SAR Object Detection
This addresses the vulnerability of SAR target detection systems to physical adversarial attacks, offering a more covert and practically deployable attack strategy.
The paper tackles the problem of adversarial attacks on SAR target detection systems by proposing an Adversarial Attenuation Patch method that balances attack effectiveness and stealthiness, achieving effective degradation of detection performance while maintaining high imperceptibility and transferability across models.
Deep neural networks have demonstrated excellent performance in SAR target detection tasks but remain susceptible to adversarial attacks. Existing SAR-specific attack methods can effectively deceive detectors; however, they often introduce noticeable perturbations and are largely confined to digital domain, neglecting physical implementation constrains for attacking SAR systems. In this paper, a novel Adversarial Attenuation Patch (AAP) method is proposed that employs energy-constrained optimization strategy coupled with an attenuation-based deployment framework to achieve a seamless balance between attack effectiveness and stealthiness. More importantly, AAP exhibits strong potential for physical realization by aligning with signal-level electronic jamming mechanisms. Experimental results show that AAP effectively degrades detection performance while preserving high imperceptibility, and shows favorable transferability across different models. This study provides a physical grounded perspective for adversarial attacks on SAR target detection systems and facilitates the design of more covert and practically deployable attack strategies. The source code is made available at https://github.com/boremycin/SAAP.