Adversarial Robustness of Deep State Space Models for Forecasting
For practitioners using SSMs in forecasting, this work reveals vulnerability principles and demonstrates that even gradient-free adversaries can significantly degrade performance.
The paper investigates the adversarial robustness of deep state-space models (SSMs) for time-series forecasting, focusing on the Spacetime SSM. It derives closed-form bounds on adversarial error and shows that model-free attacks, without gradient computation, can cause at least 33% more error than projected gradient descent with a small step size on the Monash benchmark datasets.
State-space model (SSM) for time-series forecasting have demonstrated strong empirical performance on benchmark datasets, yet their robustness under adversarial perturbations is poorly understood. We address this gap through a control-theoretic lens, focusing on the recently proposed Spacetime SSM forecaster. We first establish that the decoder-only Spacetime architecture can represent the optimal Kalman predictor when the underlying data-generating process is autoregressive - a property no other SSM possesses. Building on this, we formulate robust forecaster design as a Stackelberg game against worst-case stealthy adversaries constrained by a detection budget, and solve it via adversarial training. We derive closed-form bounds on adversarial forecasting error that expose how open-loop instability, closed-loop instability, and decoder state dimension each amplify vulnerability - offering actionable principles towards robust forecaster design. Finally, we show that even adversaries with no access to the forecaster can nonetheless construct effective attacks by exploiting the model's locally linear input-output behavior, bypassing gradient computations entirely. Experiments on the Monash benchmark datasets highlight that model-free attacks, without any gradient computation, can cause at least 33% more error than projected gradient descent with a small step size.