Explainable PQC: A Layered Interpretive Framework for Post-Quantum Cryptographic Security Assumptions
For cryptographers and standardization bodies, it offers a conceptual tool to clarify PQC security assumptions, though the contribution is incremental and organizational.
The paper proposes a layered interpretive framework for communicating post-quantum cryptographic security assumptions, combining complexity-based models, combinatorial geometry, and empirical lattice reduction experiments, but does not provide new hardness results or attacks.
This paper studies how post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) security assumptions can be represented and communicated through a structured, layered framework that is useful for technical interpretation but does not replace formal cryptographic proofs. We propose ``Explainable PQC,'' an interdisciplinary framework connecting three layers: (1) a complexity-based interpretive model that distinguishes classical security, quantum security, and reduction-backed hardness, drawing on computational complexity classes as supporting language; (2) an exploratory mathematical investigation applying combinatorial Hodge theory and polyhedral geometry to study structural aspects of lattice hardness; and (3)~an empirical experimentation platform, implemented in Julia, for measuring the behavior of lattice basis reduction algorithms (LLL, BKZ) in low-dimensional settings. The motivating case study throughout the paper is lattice-based PQC, including ML-KEM (FIPS 203) and ML-DSA (FIPS 204). The contribution of this paper is conceptual and organizational: it defines a layered interpretive framework, clarifies its scope relative to formal cryptographic proofs and reduction-based security arguments, and identifies mathematical and implementation-level directions through which PQC security claims may be more transparently communicated. This paper does not claim new cryptographic hardness results, new attacks, or concrete security parameter estimates.