Post-Quantum Cryptographic Analysis of Message Transformations Across the Network Stack
This addresses security vulnerabilities in network protocols for users and systems in the face of quantum computing threats, but it is incremental as it builds on existing cryptographic analysis with a new focus on cross-layer composition.
The paper tackles the problem of analyzing cross-layer cryptographic transformations in network communications for post-quantum readiness, developing a formal framework that classifies operations and proves composition properties, with findings such as WPA2-Personal offering better PQC posture than WPA3-Personal and WPA2-Enterprise.
When a user sends a message over a wireless network, the message does not travel as-is. It is encrypted, authenticated, encapsulated, and transformed as it descends the protocol stack from the application layer to the physical medium. Each layer may apply its own cryptographic operations using its own algorithms, and these algorithms differ in their vulnerability to quantum computers. The security of the overall communication depends not on any single layer but on the \emph{composition} of transformations across all layers. We develop a preliminary formal framework for analyzing these cross-layer cryptographic transformations with respect to post-quantum cryptographic (PQC) readiness. We classify every per-layer cryptographic operation into one of four quantum vulnerability categories, define how per-layer PQC statuses compose across the full message transformation chain, and prove that this composition forms a bounded lattice with confidentiality composing via the join (max) operator and authentication via the meet (min). We apply the framework to five communication scenarios spanning Linux and iOS platforms, and identify several research challenges. Among our findings: WPA2-Personal provides strictly better PQC posture than both WPA3-Personal and WPA2-Enterprise; a single post-quantum layer suffices for payload confidentiality but \emph{every} layer must migrate for complete authentication; and metadata protection depends solely on the outermost layer.