Homotopy-Guided Potential Games for Congestion-Aware Navigation
For multi-agent motion planning, the method addresses the bottleneck of congested equilibria by integrating homotopy reasoning, showing improved efficiency and safety over baselines.
The paper proposes a unified framework combining homotopy planners and potential games for multi-agent navigation, achieving faster completion and greater inter-agent clearance in simulations with three agents, and demonstrating robustness to irrational behaviors in hardware trials with two robots and one human.
We address the multi-agent motion planning problem where interactions, collisions, and congestion co-exist. Conventional game-theoretic planners capture interactions among agents but often converge to conservative, congested equilibria. Homotopy planners, on the other hand, can explore topologically distinct paths, but lack mechanisms to account for the interdependence of agents' future actions. We propose a unified framework that leverages homotopy classes as structured strategy sets within a receding-horizon setup. At each planning stage, a deterministic homotopy planner generates topologically distinct paths for each agent, conditioned on the joint configuration. To avoid intractable growth of candidate paths, we propose a simple heuristic filtering step that selects a top-$K$ subset of the most suitable congestion-free joint strategies to ensure computational tractability. These serve as initializations for a potential game that enforces homotopy-consistent constraints and yields a generalized open-loop Nash equilibrium (OLNE), with penalties discouraging abrupt strategy shifts in a receding-horizon setting. Simulations with three agents demonstrate improved efficiency (faster completion) and enhanced safety (greater inter-agent clearance, leading to reduced congestion) compared to a local baseline and NH-ORCA that do not reason about homotopies. Hardware trials with two robots and one human demonstrate robustness to irrational behaviors, where our method adapts by switching to alternative feasible equilibria while the baseline game fails.