Use and usability: concepts of representation in philosophy, neuroscience, cognitive science, and computer science
For researchers studying representations in biological and artificial intelligence, this paper offers a conceptual taxonomy to clarify different notions of representation, but it is a review without novel empirical results.
This paper reviews how the concept of 'usefulness' of representations has been conceptualized across neuroscience, computer science, and philosophy, identifying four aspects of use and usability and organizing perspectives into three levels. It provides a framework to navigate the multi-disciplinary literature on neural representation.
Representations play a central role in the study of both biological and artificial intelligence, as well as philosophy of mind. Across neuroscience, computer science, and philosophy, a recurring theme is that representations not only carry information but should be ``useful'' for or ``usable'' by an agent in some sense. Here, we review how the ``usefulness'' of representations has been conceptualized and how it figures into different conceptions of representation. We identify and explore four aspects of use and usability: representations generally carry \textit{information}; that information may or may not be \textit{useful} and it may or may not be encoded in a usable \textit{format}; and the representations may or may not be \textit{used downstream}. Building on these four aspects of information and use, we then organize existing perspectives on neural representations into three levels: Representations as Information (Level 1); Representations as Usable (Level 2); and Representations as Used (Level 3). Our account is meant to give readers an appreciation for the diversity of notions of ``neural representation,'' help them navigate the vast and multi-disciplinary literature on the topic, and help them clarify the appropriate notion of representation for their own investigations.