When does a control system compute? Digital, mechanical and open-loop systems
This work provides a theoretical framework for identifying computation in control systems, addressing foundational questions in cognitive science about whether non-digital systems (like the brain) compute.
The paper applies Abstraction/Representation Theory (ART) to model control systems and determine whether they perform computation. It finds that all control systems, including digital, mechanical, and open-loop examples, perform some degree of computation, with the plant serving as the user of the controller.
Control systems are ubiquitous in modern technology, comprising an engineered plant to be kept within specific, often fine-tuned, limits, and a separate controller that ensures this is the case. While modern controllers often employ digital computers, other examples are purely mechanical, or even biological. It is an open question whether computation is happening within all controllers by virtue of them being part of a control system. Abstraction/ Representation theory (ART) has been developed to tackle just this question of whether a physical system is computing. Here, we demonstrate how to use ART to model control systems, and analyse them for computational properties. We determine that the plant of a control system is (a proxy for) the representational entity necessary in ART for the existence of any computation: the plant is the user of the controller. We consider specific systems: a digital thermostat, an electro-mechanical thermostat, the purely mechanical centrifugal governor, and an open-loop human-controlled heating system. We show that all these systems, and control systems in general, are performing some degree of computation. As an initial use of these results, we apply them to computationalism within cognitive theory: we show the governor is computing, so it cannot play its role of counter-example in the question of whether the brain is too.