Information-Theoretic Authenticated PIR: From PIR-RV To APIR
For researchers in secure computation and database privacy, this work resolves a long-standing theoretical gap by showing that information-theoretic APIR can be achieved without computational assumptions, simplifying design and enabling quantum-resistant PIR.
This paper provides the first rigorous information-theoretic security definition for Authenticated PIR (APIR) against selective-failure attacks, proves that any valid information-theoretic PIR with Result Verification (itPIR-RV) can be upgraded to secure itAPIR with no extra overhead, bridging a theoretical gap and enabling quantum-resistant PIR in malicious server environments.
Private Information Retrieval (PIR) allows clients to retrieve database entries without leaking retrieval indices, yet malicious servers seriously compromise retrieval correctness. Existing Authenticated PIR (APIR) schemes resist selective-failure attacks but rely on computational hardness assumptions. In contrast, information-theoretic PIR with Result Verification (itPIR-RV) achieves integrity without computational assumptions, yet only provides relaxed query privacy with no defense against selective-failure attacks. This paper focuses on unconditionally secure information-theoretic APIR (itAPIR) constructions. We propose the rigorous information-theoretic security definition for itAPIR with statistical privacy against selective-failure attacks and integrity as core properties, formalize the hierarchical relation between itAPIR and itPIR-RV as a relaxed variant with identical integrity but basic query privacy, and prove a conversion theorem that valid itPIR-RV schemes can be directly upgraded to secure itAPIR with no extra overhead. Our work bridges the theoretical gap, simplifies itAPIR design, and enables quantum-resistant PIR in malicious server environments.