Composable Post-Quantum Security for FADEC-Coupled Dual-Spool Turbofan Cyber-Physical Systems
This work provides a theoretical framework for analyzing post-quantum security in safety-critical aerospace control systems, but is purely analytical with no operational guidance or empirical results.
The paper develops a unified mathematical model integrating post-quantum cryptographic primitives (lattice-based key establishment, PUF-based attestation) with real-time control constraints for FADEC-coupled dual-spool turbofan engines. It shows that channel uncertainty tightens key-renewal periods, ciphertext expansion affects bus schedulability, and sensing/actuator limits shape integrity thresholds, but provides no concrete performance numbers or experimental validation.
We develop a unified mathematical formulation for post-quantum authenticated telemetry and actuation in FADEC-coupled dual-spool turbofan cyber-physical systems. The formulation integrates lattice-based key establishment under LWE/SIS-style assumptions, PUF-derived attestation entropy, authenticated encryption, radar-altimeter integrity, avionics-bus timing, and Kalman residual monitoring in a stochastic hybrid model. Within this model, plant evolution, communication latency, leakage, adversarial channel quality, and cryptographic state evolve under a common filtration. We show that channel uncertainty tightens admissible key-renewal periods, that ciphertext expansion enters bus-level schedulability constraints, and that sensing and actuator limits shape integrity thresholds and allowable control delay. We further relate PUF smooth min-entropy to distinguishing advantage and connect innovation statistics to conservative alarm design. Overall, the results characterize how post-quantum security, real-time schedulability, and closed-loop stability interact in safety-critical aerospace control architectures within a defensive analytical treatment that does not provide operational guidance for interference with real platforms.