A Mission-Centric Cyber-Resilience Benchmark for Silent-Watch Operation of Electrified Ground-Platform Power Architectures
It provides a benchmark for evaluating cyber-resilience in military ground platforms, but the results are specific to this domain and incremental in nature.
This paper develops a mission-centric cyber-resilience benchmark for silent-watch operation of electrified ground platforms, showing that SOC spoofing creates a structured stealth-versus-impact envelope and that defense value depends on fallback depth, not detection alone.
Silent-watch operation makes electrified ground platforms depend on supervisory energy management because mission loads must be sustained from stored energy while the engine is off. This paper develops a mission-centric cyber-resilience benchmark for this operating mode. The benchmark connects battery state-of-charge (SOC) spoofing to mission outcomes rather than evaluating the attack only through detector response or control error. It combines a reduced-order DC-bus model, residual-based detection, fallback shedding, and four mission-facing metrics for endurance, critical-load service, unsafe-voltage exposure, and detection delay. The study shows that SOC spoofing creates a structured stealth-versus-impact envelope. Small biases have limited mission effect, intermediate biases create an endurance deficit bounded by a closed-form expression in bias magnitude, shed power, and average battery draw, and large biases disable the SOC-driven guard. The results also show that defense value depends on fallback depth, not detection alone. An undersized fallback action can leave the Defended case worse than the undefended Attacked case. MATLAB-to-Simulink parity across five regression scenarios provides a software-verified basis for OPAL-RT/EXataCPS hardware-in-the-loop testing.