WAAA! Web Adversaries Against Agentic Browsers
For security researchers and developers of agentic browsing systems, this work reveals critical blind spots in existing threat models by showing that traditional web attacks can be amplified against LLM-powered agents.
This paper proposes the first web-focused threat model for agentic browsers, identifying 20 attacks (18 implemented) that combine traditional web attacks with LLM vulnerabilities. The attacks reproduce across 4 major LLM models, revealing five failure modes that necessitate rearchitecting agentic browsers.
Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly being integrated into web browsers to create agentic browsing systems that execute actions on behalf of the user. Prior work considering the security of agentic browsers focuses exclusively on indirect prompt-injection attacks. However, by failing to consider traditional web attacks, previous agentic browser threat models have a blind spot to web social engineering attacks originally designed to trick humans. In this paper, we propose the first web-focused threat model for agentic browsers and use it to derive a taxonomy of 20 attacks across both the web and LLM space, and implement 18 of the attacks. Our threat model extends the original See$\rightarrow$Act browser agent model to account for all components of a browser, and frames the agent as a confused deputy unable to distinguish task steps from traditional web attacks. We show that 10 web threats can reemerge often in amplified forms once an agent can be influenced by untrusted page content. We further conduct a generalizability study on 14 of the 20 attacks, showing that our attacks reproduce across 4 major LLM models spanning multiple vendors. We show that agentic browsers exhibit five major failure modes when facing traditional and LLM web threats, demonstrating the need to rearchitect agentic browsers before they are ready for the current web.