Spying Across Chiplets: Side-Channel Attacks in 2.5/3D Integrated Systems
It identifies a new physical attack surface in 2.5/3D integrated systems for security researchers and hardware designers.
The paper demonstrates that side-channel attacks can be mounted across chiplets within the same package or stack by repurposing a communication-oriented chiplet as an internal observation platform, with experimental results showing that captured signals reveal information correlated with a neighboring victim chiplet's activity.
Advanced packaging and chiplet-based integration are increasingly adopted to build complex heterogeneous systems beyond the limits of monolithic scaling. While these architectures offer major benefits in terms of modularity, yield, and performance, they also introduce new physical attack surfaces. In this paper, we show that side-channel attacks can be mounted across chiplets within the same package or stack. Our key idea is that a communication-oriented chiplet, originally intended to interact with the external environment through an antenna, an RFID-like element, or another contactless coupling structure, can be repurposed as an internal observation platform. We formalize this threat through a realistic adversary model, describe the corresponding attack principle, and experimentally assess its feasibility. The obtained results demonstrate that signals captured through such a communication-oriented interface can reveal information correlated with the activity of a neighboring victim chiplet.